| 'Road
to Berlin' Scenario Preview
Part Two
By Mike Bennighof
July 2006
Writing, testing and honing 75 scenarios
for Panzer
Grenadier: Road to Berlin was an enormous
amount of work, but we’re pretty sure
it produced the best set we’ve made
to date. Here’s a look at the historical
background of the second set of 25 scenarios.
(You can see the first 25 here.)
Scenario Twenty-Six:
Ad Hoc
1 February 1945
Only in the German Army could “official
ad hoc units” exist. On the afternoon
of 31 January two such battalions were ordered
to attack the new Soviet bridgehead over the
Oder River at the village of Kienitz. The
troops had never met one another until that
afternoon and were armed only with rifles;
but the assistance of several tanks from the
National Socialist Driver Training School
was expected to make a difference.
Conclusion
The ad hoc battalions pushed forward with
remarkable will, but the darkness and lack
of control broke them into small groups. The
Soviets shattered them with ease, and over
half of the troops committed were killed in
action — young soldiers who might have
added to the strength of existing formations.
Some among the Soviet leadership thought they
might roll into Berlin within days.
Scenario Twenty-Seven:
Oder Flood
2 February 1945
Along the line of the Oder River, the Germans
attempted to halt the Soviet advance and keep
them out of the German heartland around Berlin.
After the line stabilized, Red Army reinforcements
began at first forcing and then enlarging
bridgeheads over the river. At Genschmar,
troops from 2nd Guards Army entered a small
bridgehead and began probing to the west.
A German counter-attack force quickly flung
themselves on the invaders.
Conclusion
The Soviets advanced past the dike but were
driven back by the German attack. After heavy
fighting along the dike, sometimes hand-to-hand,
the Germans could not break through the barrier
and reeled back. They had kept the Soviets
from expanding their bridgehead, but they
could not wipe it out. Soon the Red Army would
ferry more tanks over the river and make a
new attempt.
Scenario Twenty-Eight:
Hero of the Soviet Union
3 February 1945
Commanding a makeshift division arrayed
along the Oder, Maj. Gen. Adolf Raegener watched
helplessly as Soviet battalions swarmed over
the river and drove back his labor troops,
police and other “alarm” units.
Loaned a good mechanized battalion, and gathering
his own troops, Raegener ordered a counterattack
to drive them back. But assembling these forces
took hours, and the Germans did not jump off
until night was falling. Raegener did not
wish to attack in the darkness, but his division
had no radios and depended on the civilian
telephone network for communications.
Conclusion
Poorly coordinated, the attackers moved
ahead sporadically but had come within sight
of their objectives when Sgt. Sergei Mostovoy
took a hand. Apparently becoming completely
berserk when his machine-gun team ran out
of ammunition and grenades, Mostovoy, one
of the largest men in the Red Army, threw
aside the overheated barrel and hefted the
tripod as a weapon. Braining Nazis until the
mounting bent, he then took hold of a shovel
and killed several more. When that broke as
well, he tucked one hapless German under his
arm and squeezed until the man passed out.
The rest of the attackers threw down their
weapons and ran screaming into the night.
Mostovoy was named a Hero of the Soviet Union
for his exploits.
Scenario Twenty-Nine:
Night of the Swabians
4 February 1945
Recently arrived from the Western Front,
the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division had been
flung into action as it arrived. Once the
division staff had its bearings, they gathered
their armored elements together for a night
attack on the the Soviet bridgehead over the
Oder around Gieshof. The 301st Rifle Division
had crossed the river several days earlier
against minimal opposition and its command
did not expect a spirited counter-attack.
Conclusion
The Soviets, taken by surprise, fell back
in disarray and the Germans secured Gieshof.
Fighting would continue in the area for two
more months as the Germans struggled to hold
the river line and the Soviets recovered from
their rapid advance across Poland. It would
be soldiers of the 301st who raised the hammer
and sickle over the Reich Chancellery in late
April.
Scenario Thirty: Brandenburg
Panzers
5 February 1945
Just to the north of the Raegener Division’s
struggle to contain 79th Guards Rifle Division,
the Brandenburg Panzer Grenadier Division’s
tank battalion tried to drive the Soviets
back over the Alte Oder, a shallow alternate
channel that ran just to the west of the big
river. The tankers had long experience and
new vehicles, but were sent into battle by
V SS Mountain Corps without infantry support.
Conclusion
Political appointees like SS Gen. Friedrich-Wilhelm
Krüger of V SS Mountain Corps had little
experience in managing a battlefield, repeatedly
bungling matters that experienced staff officers
would have easily handled. The Brandenburgers,
knowing their own unit to be politically suspect,
moved out as ordered without any accompanying
infantry. The tankers did surprisingly well,
but the Guards had arranged several heavy
anti-tank batteries with interlocking fields
of fire that the Panthers could not penetrate.
Without foot soldiers to dig out the guns,
the battalion had to abandon what had begun
as a promising offensive.
Scenario Thirty-One:
Reitwein Forest
5 February 1945
While other bits and pieces of Raegener’s
division attacked the Soviet bridgehead, the
Soviets responded by launching attacks of
their own on other sectors held by the division.
To the south of the Brandenburg Panzer attack,
a regiment of officer cadets arrived on the
battlefield just in time to face one of these
Soviet advances.
Conclusion
The German cadets met their objective by
holding the Soviets out of the village of
Podelzig, but suffered heavily in the operation.
It was one of the division’s few bright
spots as more and more Soviet troops crossed
the Oder in preparation for the final drive
on Berlin. But committing officer candidates
to battle at all was a sure sign that the
German Army was near total collapse.
Scenario Thirty-Two:
Luck of the 21st Panzer
7 February 1945
Hastily issued new tanks and assault guns,
rushed across Germany and unloaded on open
sidings rather than at a station, Col. Hans
von Luck’s 21st Panzer Division received
orders to immediately attack advancing Soviet
forces and escort a supply convoy into the
Küstrin fortress. Difficulties unloading
the heavy vehicles on an open stretch of track,
and roads clogged by refugees, delayed the
start of the operation until the wee hours
of the morning.
Conclusion
The 21st was a veteran, well-led division
with new equipment; but the Soviets fought
tenaciously, while rain and mud helped slow
the Germans as well. The attack failed to
take Gorgast and the supply convoy had no
road to Küstrin. The rains would only
grow heavier in coming days, halting the Soviet
offensive for several weeks — a precious
pause of which the Germans would make little
use.
Scenario Thirty-Three:
Out of Luck
9 February 1945
The arrival of the 21st Panzer Division
in front of Berlin gave the 9th Army command
a powerful armored force to help stabilize
its lines. The division set about forcing
open a corridor to the beleaguered fortress
at Küstrin along the road from Gorgast.
The Soviets planned to prevent the Küstrin
garrison’s escape to aid to Berlin’s
defense, not understanding the depths of Hitler’s
insanity which insisted on holding the old
city on the east bank of the Oder as a jumping-off
spot for his planned grand counter-offensive.
Conclusion
Aided by famed Stuka pilot Hans-Ulrich Rudel
(who was shot down during this operation),
the 21st fought its way through to the Küstrin
perimeter in the face of fierce Soviet resistance
and increasing mud and rain. The corridor
thus opened would remain the fortress’
lifeline for the next several weeks. Having
seen what a well-equipped panzer division
could mean to Berlin’s mobile defense,
Adolf Hitler ordered the formation immediately
transferred to Silesia and its place taken
by two hastily-raised infantry divisions made
up of new recruits.
Scenario Thirty-Four:
Infantry Attacks
13-14 February 1945
Seen as the last line of defense before
Berlin, the Oder River took on great import
to both the German and Soviet high commands.
The Soviets had established many bridgeheads
over the rain-swollen river, and the Germans
were determined to wipe them out by any means
necessary — deploying suicide planes,
frogmen and guided missiles against the bridges
themselves, and flinging all manner of hastily-formed
ground units against the Soviet enclaves.
None were of much use.
Conclusion
Though only recently organized, the Döberitz
division had a high concentration of infantry
instructors among its NCO’s and junior
officers and a surprising amount of fighting
spirit. But heavy mud and Soviet resistance
combined to keep them from achieving their
goals. The Red Army clung to its bridgeheads
over the Oder, and everyone knew that when
the weather cleared, the advance would resume.
Scenario Thirty-Five:
Kutuzov’s Heart
16 February 1945
As Soviet troops drove into Silesia, the
industrial region between Poland and Bohemia,
they neared the town of Bunzlau. Marshal Mikhail
Kutuzov, vanquisher of Napoleon, died there
in 1813 and his heart was buried on the spot.
Soviet commanders made capture of the town
a top priority, hoping to reap propaganda
value from the rescue of the old general’s
vital organ from the Nazis. Kutuzov had been
resurrected as a national hero in the Great
Patriotic War’s propaganda effort, and
now the modern Red Army’s generals saw
themselves emulating his feats. The Germans,
for their part, stood ready to deny the town
to the Soviets simply because the Soviets
wanted it — they do not seem to have
been aware of the political significance of
the site.
Conclusion
The Soviet 6th Guard Tank Corps had already
been repelled by the 1st Ski Division (Soviet
sources claim this was 19th Panzer) when the
fresh division struck it again. Poor handling
on the part of Rybalko’s elite 3rd Guard
Tank Army headquarters had placed the corps
in an untenable position, and it fell back
with heavy losses. The old marshal’s
internal organs would have to wait another
month for liberation.
Scenario Thirty-Six:
South Wind
17 February 1945
On the north bank of the Danube, the Soviets
had been pushed back from Komorn but still
held a bridgehead over the Gran River. With
great difficulty, the Germans moved their
armored formations from the south bank to
the north to eliminate this threat in “Operation
South Wind.” This was seen as a necessary
prerequisite to the re-capture of Budapest,
and an opportunity to catch Soviet mechanized
formations in the front line and destroy them.
Conclusion
The move of armored formations away from
the Hungarian plain had been detected by Red
Army intelligence and interpreted as the very
sensible re-deployment of these crack units
to defend Berlin. Their appearance on the
north bank of the Danube caught the Soviets
totally by surprise: no one expected such
an insane strategic move. The Tigers and infantry
rolled over the Soviets, destroying many vehicles
and according to German claims, a number of
heavy anti-tank guns for the loss of one Tiger.
Scenario Thirty-Seven:
Gran Intermezzo
19 February 1945
The fall of Budapest on 11 February had
released a number of Soviet formations, which
gathered north of the Danube. Operation South
Wind was designed to throw them back over
the Gran River, and by achieving surprise
the Germans did just that. The attack continued,
with a daring night assault on a small Soviet
bridgehead at Kemend, about six kilometers
north of the Gran’s junction with the
Danube. No other bridges stood between Kemend
and the bigger river, making it a key German
goal to seal off this potential invasion route.
Conclusion
Soviet minefields stopped the German attack
cold, as the Tiger commanders proved unwilling
to advance until the engineers could assure
them of mine-free routes. The fighting along
the Gran would continue for another week,
presaging even more combat in Hungary for
Germany’s rapidly-dwindling elite forces.
Scenario Thirty-Eight:
Flemings Sabred
19 February 1945
The Germans had planned to launch Operation
Winter Solstice on 16 February, striking the
Soviets in the flank as they advanced on Berlin
and hoping to isolate their armored spearheads.
Col. Gen. Heinz Guderian’s bold plan
might have had a small chance of success,
but Adolf Hitler diverted all but one of the
crack, full-strength panzer divisions slated
for the operation to Hungary. Then Joachim
Ziegler, the stunningly incompetent commander
of the 11th SS “Nordland” Panzer
Grenadier Division, jumped off his attacks
a day early. The attack gained very little
ground and within a few days the Soviets were
on the counter-attack.
Conclusion
The Soviets swept over the Langemarck Division,
a formation of Belgian volunteers, with little
trouble. In other sectors the Germans put
up much fiercer resistance, and the attack
was halted for two weeks while heavy rains
made operations difficult. When the Soviet
offensive resumed, they would sweep to the
Baltic coast with little difficulty.
Scenario Thirty-Nine:
Evil Russians
2 March 1945
Once the rains had let up along the Oder
front, the Soviets began fresh offensive operations.
The Germans had brought up a handful of fresh
troops, but were scraping the bottom of their
manpower barrel: facing 8th Guards Tank Army
were trainees formed into a new division,
politically suspect special forces troops
thrown into regular duty, and Gen. A.A. Vlasov’s
legion of Russian traitors in German uniform.
Conclusion
The large-scale Soviet attack floundered
in the face of an unusually heavy German artillery
barrage, tank destroyers firing from cover
and fanatic individual tank-hunting by the
Russian mercenaries. Artillery fire separated
the Red Army’s infantry from the tanks,
and their former comrades-in-arms made the
tankers pay a heavy price for lack of protecting
foot soldiers. By afternoon the Germans were
confident enough to mount a counter-attack,
which also fell apart under heavy artillery
fire.
Scenario Forty: Clash
of Giants
6 March 1945
With Germany’s last armored reserves,
Adolf Hitler demanded an attack be launched
in Hungary with the coming of spring. There
would still be frost, he declared, to keep
the ground firm and the Red Army would never
expect an attack in Hungary as Budapest had
fallen in February. The Soviet command definitely
did not expect such lunacy, and though enemy
Panzer formations had been identified and
anti-tank defenses put in place, the Red generals
did not really believe an attack would actually
commence. Right on schedule, the Panzers advanced
on Seregelyes.
Conclusion
The Soviets at first stopped the German
advance, but the Tigers shot up the Soviet
heavy tanks and the panzers resumed their
march. The Red Army had not expected an assault
would come in this sector with Berlin in danger,
but even at this late date the German showed
they could conduct mobile assaults with skill.
The Tigers rumbled forward toward the Danube,
with seemingly little in the way that could
stop them.
Scenario Forty-One:
Spring Awakened
6 March 1945
Just what the German offensive in Hungary
was meant to accomplish is hard to determine
more than six decades later; it certainly
made little strategic or operational sense.
Between the muddy ground slowing the German
tanks and poor march discipline tangling formations,
the attack went forward hours late. The Soviets
met most of the attacks with infantry and
well-prepared anti-tank defenses, but south
of the road junction of Seregelyes one of
the newly-arrived panzer divisions struck
a Soviet tank corps willing to contest their
advance.
Conclusion
Much of the German armor had not even made
it to the battlefield, and that which did
was slowed by the mixture of mud and snow.
The Soviet tanks were also slowed, but not
as badly, and the Germans took the worst of
the fighting. While other German units made
great penetrations on the offensive’s
first day, the Hohenstaufen Division had nothing
to show for its efforts.
Scenario Forty-Two:
Children of Vienna
6 March 1945
In most armies, doctrine held that prepared
defensive lines should first be breached by
infantry units, with armored formations committed
later to exploit their breakthroughs. German
generals urged this approach for the Spring
Awakening offensive in Hungary, but Adolf
Hitler insisted on using his beloved SS panzer
divisions in the first rank and there were
few infantry divisions that had been refitted
to first-line status. One of the few was the
44th “Hoch und Deutschmeister,”
an Austrian unit known as the “Children
of Vienna” that traced its history to
the old Imperial Army’s finest regiment.
Conclusion
Traditional practice was not borne out in
this action: the 44th did not make significant
gains and the opposing Guards division held
their lines with relative ease. The Soviets
would be in much more trouble from SS panzer
divisions penetrating on either side of them,
and the 36th (a very good division, formed
from several airborne brigades and holding
the Red Banner) would be forced to withdraw
on the next day with little of their discomfort
due to the Austrian troops opposing them.
Scenario Forty-Three:
The Potato Fortress
12 March 1945
Piece by piece, the Kurmark Panzer Grenadier
Division took control over so many small ad
hoc battalions and regiments that it approached
the strength of some of the German armies
deployed at the front in the spring of 1945.
Among these were regiments of officer school
cadets, highly motivated and usually combat-experienced
young soldiers. One of these had been assigned
to the village of Wuhden just south of Reitwein
and west of the Oder. When Soviet troops surrounded
them there, the division commander, Col. Willi
Langkeit, ordered the cadets to break out.
Adolf Hitler personally countermanded Langkeit’s
order, declaring Wuhden a “fortress”
to be held to the last man, its importance
due to the key military facility located there.
The “facility” turned out to be
a barn holding several tons of potatoes slated
for the Army commissariat. Having already
ignored numerous “Führer Orders”
to execute his own troops for cowardice, Langkeit
tossed this latest into the fire as well and
confirmed the order for the cadets to make
their way out of town.
Conclusion
The Germans ate the last potatoes, then
broke out of Wuhden. They managed to reach
their own lines, but not without the loss
of 80 percent of the cadets. Langkeit continued
to file fictitious reports of the heroic resistance
of Fortress Wuhden for the next four days,
at the end of which Hitler ordered the garrison
to blow up the “facility” and
break out. The Greatest General of All Times
also directed the immediate commissioning
of every survivor as a lieutenant. The division
commander manufactured a suitably heroic tale
of the escape for his Führer, who tacked
on two weeks’ leave as a reward for
each survivor.
Scenario Forty-Four:
König’s Tigers
13 March 1945
Led by Capt. König, the 509th Heavy
Tank Battalion spearheaded the 1st Panzer
Division’s Battle Group Bradel in its
drive toward the Danube River, south of Budapest.
The Soviets had expected the assault, and
prepared several lines of defense. Southeast
of Lake Velenz the big tanks ran into a battalion
of heavy assault guns in prepared positions.
Conclusion
German and Soviet accounts of this battle
are at extreme variance — the German
account is adamant that the Royal Tigers met
and overcame two dozen of the Red Army’s
biggest armored vehicles. The Soviet situation
maps and battle accounts list no unit with
the big JSU-152 machines anywhere near the
battlefield (only the unit shown in the scenario
could possibly have been involved), with only
the Lend-Lease Shermans of 23rd Tank Corps
engaging the Germans on this day. The Germans
claim to have destroyed all 24 JSU-152 assault
guns at the cost of three Tigers; the Soviets
claim to have held their positions with infantry
and anti-tank guns only. While both sides
lied shamelessly in their accounts of the
fighting, the German fabrications make for
a more interesting scenario.
Scenario Forty-Five:
Courland Pocket
13 March 1945
When Soviet armies surged through the German
lines in October, 1944 to the Baltic Sea,
they trapped 400,000 soldiers of the German
Army Group North in western Latvia. Adolf
Hitler repeatedly refused to evacuate them
to help defend Germany, and they occupied
the attention of several times their number
of Red Army troops (just how many is still
disputed). The Soviets made numerous attempts
to liquidate the “Courland Pocket,”
one of the most serious coming in March near
the town of Saldus.
Conclusion
The Latvian “volunteers” fought
off the Soviet attacks with heavy losses,
and were on the brink of collapse when the
weather suddenly warmed above freezing. Heavy
mud brought the Red Army to a total halt as
both sides found themselves unable to move
vehicles or artillery except on the region’s
very few paved roads. The Courland Pocket
would outlast the Third Reich, only surrendering
when Germany herself gave up.
Scenario Forty-Six:
South of Balaton
20 March 1945
While tank battles raged to the northeast
of Hungary’s inland sea, Lake Balaton,
on its south shore German forces had advanced
perhaps a bit too far. The Soviet 135th Rifle
Corps, ordered to draw off as many Axis reinforcements
as possible while the advancing tank forces
cut off the Germans, sent its infantry forward
against a sector held by a mixed German-Hungarian
force. Both Axis units had shown weak performance
in the recent past, and each division commander
seems to have believed it was his unit’s
task to buttress the other.
Conclusion
It made little difference to the overall
picture, as the Germans would soon be forced
to retreat by their defeats in other sectors.
But the Soviets pushed the horsemen back from
their exposed salient along the lakeshore.
Soon the Germans would be racing to put all
of Hungary behind them.
Scenario Forty-Seven:
Guards Meet Guards
20 March 1945
The 1st SS “Adolf Hitler Life Guards”
Panzer Division had been sent to Hungary to
help spearhead a mighty new offensive against
the Soviets. But heavy snow and thick mud
slowed the panzer divisions, and when the
Soviets made their counter-stroke, they spearheaded
it with rifle divisions advancing on foot.
Conclusion
The two divisions met head on and engaged
in a fierce struggle, with both sides suffering
heavy casualties. Despite Soviet advantages
in firepower and air support, fanatical SS
resistance held up the advance and enraged
Soviet Marshal Fedor Tolbukin. For his part,
the “Greatest General of All Times”
fumed that his namesake division had failed
him. Postwar SS apologists, apparently seeking
to distance their heroes from the madman,
would claim that the troops sent Hitler the
severed arm of a comrade killed in this action,
but like many tales of SS heroism this appears
to be pure fiction (among other inconsistencies,
this weird legend begs the question of just
how they shipped a body part to the Führerbunker
when the Reich could not easily move ammunition
or fuel between Berlin and Hungary).
Scenario Forty-Eight:
Küstrin Corridor
22 March 1945
A narrow strip of German-controlled ground
connected the 18th-century fortress of Küstrin
at the junction of the Warthe and Oder Rivers
to the German lines outside Berlin. Küstrin
had held out for over a month when Marshal
Georgi Zhukov ordered his subordinates to
finally eliminate this German bridgehead.
Step one was a concerted attack on the corridor.
Conclusion
The disparate German formations flung randomly
together in front of Berlin had little coordination
(most of the SS battalion’s parent division
was in Hungary, for example, while the panzer
battalion had a fairly random selection of
mostly-new tanks and assault guns), and the
Guardsmen had been heavily reinforced by 8th
Guards Army. The Guards drove into the German
position despite heavy tank losses to the
German Panthers, and forced their way through
to link up with other attacking Soviets to
the north.
Scenario Forty-Nine:
Horses and Tigers
24 March 1945
With the situation in western Hungary deteriorating
by the hour, the Germans began a headlong
retreat into the Bakony Forest northwest of
Lake Balaton. Just north of the lake’s
northeastern corner, the most modern and archaic
units in the German force joined to slow the
enemy pursuit. The Soviets for their part
now smelled blood and hoped to finish off
the wounded Nazi state.
Conclusion
The Germans claimed 16 Soviet tanks knocked
out, including eight Stalin tanks, against
the loss of three Tigers. The next morning
the battalion reported that it blew up 14
of its own Royal Tigers because of a lack
of fuel; the Soviets of course reported them
destroyed in combat. The Germans formed defensive
positions where they would be pocketed within
a week, while the Soviet armored forces finally
probed into the gap between the German 2nd
Panzer and 6th SS Panzer Armies and shot through
it toward Vienna.
Scenario Fifty: Final
Counter Attack
27 March 1945
With Soviet armies storming over the Oder
River, the last natural barrier in front of
Berlin, Adolf Hitler projected a series of
counter-attacks to drive them back. Knowing
this to be a doomed enterprise, the command
staff at German Ninth Army sent four divisions
out of the Frankfurt bridgehead anyway, hoping
to keep the Soviets off balance a little longer.
Conclusion
The German panzers did surprisingly well,
taking their initial objectives and sowing
confusion in the Soviet ranks. The Soviets,
for their part, appear to have assumed the
German command would never be so insane as
to throw away their last panzer reserves in
such a cavalier manner. While the German tanks
advanced, their accompanying infantry fell
victim to massed enemy artillery and rocket
fire. “The attack was a massacre,”
army group commander Col. Gen. Gotthard Heinrici,
the “Poisonous Dwarf,” raged to
his staff. “The Ninth Army has suffered
incredible losses for almost nothing.”
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