Battles of 1866:
The Austrian Officer Corps, Part I

I like all the games I work on here at Avalanche Press; that part of the job (the part that doesn’t involve either asking or hearing, “When can we expect a check?”) is an awful lot of fun. I hold a doctorate in history from Emory University, and Battles of 1866 is the first time in a long while I’ve gotten to work on a game related to my actual specialty, Austria’s 1866 war against Prussia and Italy.

One of the more trying questions surrounding the 1866 campaign is the nature and quality of Austrian leadership. Dismissed as “stupid” or “pampered aristocrats” by amateur students of the period, the reality is much more complex.

In 1866, Austria’s army was the most experienced in Europe. It had fought a losing war with France in 1859, and defeated the combined armies of pre-unification Italy in 1848 and 1849. A vicious civil war had also been waged against Hungary in 1848 and 1849. And Austria (with Prussian aid) defeated Denmark in 1864.

Smaller numbers of Austrian officers and soldiers had served unofficially in the pope’s campaign against Royal Italy in 1860, and with Maximilian’s Imperial Mexican Army between 1863 and 1866. The officer corps had been thoroughly blooded, and instilled with a staunch professionalism by its hero, the great Josef Graf Radetzky.

But in 1866, this well-oiled war machine was smashed in just six weeks by Prussia. Austria had tried to learn from its defeat in the 1859 war. The army got one lesson right: It replaced its smoothbore cannons with rifled pieces, and trained its gunners to peak efficiency. But it got one horribly wrong: The infantry adopted the so-called stosstaktik, forming tightly-packed assault columns for bayonet charges, Against Prussia’s breechloading needle gun, the result was utter disaster. This need not have happened more than once or twice; several Austrian generals showed they could overcome Prussia’s superior weapons through better tactics. Why did the rest miss this?

In this update, we’ll take a look at some of the Austrian leader pieces and some of the reasoning behind their ratings. We’ll include a few pieces from Gettysburg and Chickamauga & Chattanooga for comparison’s sake.

Reading from bottom to top, each leader piece in War of the States/War of the Empires is rated for Command Radius (the distance over which he can project his will), Tactical (how much he can add to a unit’s combat ability; in essence, what will happen when he screams, “Follow me!”) and Initiative.

High Command

Kaiser Franz Josef’s first decision, according to the old historical tradition surrounding the 1866 war, was a commander for the forces facing Prussia, known as Northern Army. This red herring was demolished in the 1960s by Manfried Rauchensteiner, but still resurfaces periodically.

In truth, the Emperor had no choice but to name Ludwig von Benedek, pre-war commander of Austria’s forces in northern Italy. Austria’s greatest soldier, the “Second Radetzky,” his reputation from the 1848 and 1859 wars was unmatched.

Ludwig von Benedek
(Yes, Austria’s commander-in-chief
wore a corset.)

Benedek was a brave man, without question, but handling Northern Army’s 13 separate formations proved beyond his capability. It’s a good question whether another commander could have done any better in those circumstances; lack of the intermediate army-level headquarters deployed by the Prussians pushed an incredible workload on the commander and his staff.

Benedek made a number of strategic errors, but these have no bearing on a battle game like Battles of 1866. He prepared his army for Königgrätz pretty well considering the circumstances: forbidding charges without heavy artillery preparation first, digging his troops into trenches, and forcing the Prussians to attack into the face of the superior Austrian cannon.

He arrayed his troops in a broad arc, to guard against the convergence of three Prussian armies in front of Königgrätz, a fortress and peacetime training area. For the first phase of the battle things went well. Then two of his corps commanders decided to leave their trenches and attack the Prussians. Things unraveled from there, and the Austrians suffered an overwhelming defeat.

Personal courage ranked first with the Emperor and with the army’s generals, and Benedek receives a good tactical rating as a result. In a close action, Benedek is a man soldiers will follow into enemy fire. His radius is low, and his initiative only fair.

Archduke Albrecht

He’s still a better choice than the leading alternative, Archduke Albrecht. Son of the famed Archduke Charles, extremely near-sighted and highly conservative, Albrecht had a high reputation among some Austrian generals. Others noted that he had very little combat experience, having held no battlefield command in the 1859 war with France and only serving briefly at the front in 1848. Before the 1866 war, he served as the highly unpopular military governor of Hungary.

Albrecht held the titular command of the Southern Army when it defeated the Italians at Custoza in 1866, and this became the foundation of his later political power. The very able Southern army chief of staff, Franz von John, drew up the battle plans and conducted them. Albrecht did not approach the front lines at Custoza, carefully remaining out of harm’s way throughout. His ratings are correspondingly low, with minimal range and initiative and no effect on combat.

Though seldom mentioned by historians of the 1866 war, Franz Josef did have a third choice. Prince Fritz Liechtenstein was the only other Austrian general still physically active yet holding enough seniority to lead an army in wartime. Sovereign of the tiny mountain principality (which sent its entire army, all 66 men, to aid Southern Army), Liechtenstein had carried a rifle in the 1848 war as a volunteer sniper. Personally brave but considered somewhat of a dullard, he expected to lead the Southern Army when Benedek received the northern command. Informed that this would go to Albrecht, the prince then (apparently intentionally) rode about hatless in the hot Italian sun until he toppled from his horse. Pleading sunstroke, he retired from the army rather than lead a corps under the vindictive archduke.

The valid “what if?” of the campaign is Austrian retention of the army-level headquarters abolished in 1862. With subordinate commanders to handle parts of the battlefield, Benedek might have proven adequate. Like most counter-factuals, though, there are many other factors to consider: Benedek and many of his corps commanders cordially hated one another, and there’s no guarantee an army commander would have shown any more obedience than did some of the more willful corps commanders.

Corps Command: The Good

Austria’s real problem lay in its military educational system. Would-be generals studied languages, engineering and most of all military history. They often spoke in terms of past glories, and planned their battles using the lessons of the past. This had resulted in great successes; Archduke Charles defeated Napoleon at Aspern in 1809 using a plan based on Prince Eugene of Savoy’s win at Zenta in 1697. Albrecht’s victory at Custoza is a simple repeat of Radetzky’s victory there in 1848. When handed a new situation, or when misjudging it, as happened to Benedek at Königgrätz, things fell apart quickly.

It’s not a surprise that Austria’s best junior commander came from outside the Austrian system. Ludwig von Gablenz, son of a Saxon general, transferred to Austrian service in hopes of seeing more action. He commanded the very successful Austrian expeditionary force in Denmark in 1864. In 1866, he presided over Northern Army’s only significant victory; in command of X Corps, he won at Trautenau.

Austria’s other skilled commander is Leopold von Edelsheim-Gyulai of the 1st Light Cavalry Division. This Magyar aristocrat equipped his men with modern breechloading rifles out of his own pocket, and led them with panache at Podol and Königgrätz. His other claim to fame was personally lopping off the arm of French Marshal Canrobert during the Battle of Solferino in 1859.

Albrecht’s appointment to Southern Army posed another problem for Benedek: Albrecht’s cousin, the Emperor, propped him up with the army’s best corps commanders and allowed him to retain John, Southern Army’s brilliant chief of staff, John.

In some of the future updates, we’ll take a look at the Bad and the Indifferent among Austria’s high command (the other six corps commanders), and take a similar look at the Prussians.

Mike Bennighof
December 2004