| Dutch
Battlecruisers
By Mike Bennighof, Ph.D.
November 2005
One of the defining words
of Twentieth Century power politics was “autarky”
— a nation’s total economic independence.
To be truly powerful, a nation had to control
not only its own industries, but the raw materials
to feed them and the markets in which to sell
their products. By the late 1930s, that brought
a number of the old empires that controlled
such resources onto a collision course with
the revisionist powers (Germany, Italy, Japan)
that wanted them.
In 1938, the Netherlands
authorized a large re-armament program to
defend its interests, especially in the East
Indies (the modern Indonesia). Japanese industry
needed the oil and other raw materials from
the islands, and the aggressive words coming
out of Tokyo made it clear that a buy-and-sell
relationship was not going to be enough.

Light cruiser Java. More than
this old veteran would be needed to
stop the Imperial Japanese Navy. |
In the 1890s and early 1900s, the Dutch navy
had patrolled the East Indies with a flotilla
of armored ships, sort of a cross between
a slow armored cruiser and a long-range coast-defense
ship. These had heavy guns to deter enemy
cruisers, but their low speed made them clearly
defensive and no threat to other European
powers or the Japanese. But the experience
of the First World War showed them to be no
match for modern cruisers, and so during the
war years the Dutch laid down three large,
modern light cruisers for the East Indies
station. One of the three was cancelled and
later replaced by the more modern but ultimately
less capable De
Ruyter.
Three cruisers remained
the Dutch standard, but in the mid-1930s the
navy’s leaders became convinced these
needed to be the sort of “super cruisers”
discussed in many naval journals of the time.
Naval limitations treaties kept cruisers at
10,000 tons displacement and a main armament
of 8-inch and later 6-inch guns.
The Dutch had not been asked
to sign the treaties, and so had no legal
barrier to creating a “Treaty Cruiser
Killer.” In the event of war with Japan,
the Dutch did not expect to meet the main
Japanese battle fleet — that would be
tied down by either direct confrontation with
the Americans and British, or at least the
threat of such a clash. A Japanese invasion
of the East Indies would be spearheaded, they
believed, by several squadrons of the Imperial
Navy’s “Type A” cruisers.
The Japanese had laid down
a dozen cruisers with 8-inch guns, and secretly
converted six more “light cruisers”
to carry the heavier guns. These squadrons
rarely exercised with the battle fleet, and
Dutch naval intelligence believed these would
be their main opponents in wartime. The Dutch
also noted that the big
seaplane carriers usually worked with
the cruiser squadrons and not the full-deck
carriers. Therefore, Dutch surface ships would
not be exposed to overwhelming carrier-based
air attack.

Dutch inspiration. Scharnhorst
in 1939. |
Against even two or three
of the Japanese heavy cruisers, the three
Dutch light cruisers on the East Indies station
(two of them usually on patrol and one undergoing
refit at home) would have no chance. But the
threat of a Cruiser Killer lurking among the
archipelago would force the Japanese to hold
off an actual invasion until it was eliminated.
The greater range of the Cruiser Killer’s
guns would allow her to sink the Japanese
ships from well outside a range at which the
cruisers could hurt the bigger ship. Three
of these big cruisers could paralyze Japanese
invasion plans.
The 1938 plan therefore
centered on a trio of battle cruisers, with
guns heavy enough to smash a treaty cruiser
and enough speed to engage it. There would
also be two more light cruisers with six-inch
guns, to replace the aging Java and
Sumatra, two flotilla leaders to give
the Dutch destroyers some gunfire support
against the more heavily-armed Japanese “special
type” destroyers, as well as destroyers,
submarines and assorted light craft.
A 40,000-ton floating dock
for the Soerabaya naval yard, plus new shore
batteries and airfield improvements for Soerabaya,
indicated another policy shift. Refits would
in the future take place in the East Indies,
meaning that all three units would be available
for operations in times of crisis.
The Netherlands possessed
a highly competent shipbuilding industry,
but the navy had lost confidence in native
engineers with the poorly-designed De Ruyter.
The Dutch firm Ingenieurskantoor voor
Scheepsbouw (I.v.S), a front for the German
shipyards AG Vulkan and Krupp-Germaniawerft,
provided a design based on the German Scharnhorst
class, which were then fitting out in
German yards.
Scharnhorst had been
designed to political, not military, specifications
and never truly met German needs. The main
armament of nine 283mm (11.1-inch) guns had
been fitted to appease British fears, and
the Germans hoped to replace them with six
380mm (15-inch) guns as soon as possible.
The ships were not fitted for commerce raiding,
with steam turbines rather than long-range
diesels like the “pocket battleships,”
yet lacked the firepower to challenge enemy
battleships. While they certainly could shoot
up British treaty cruisers, this was not a
mission the Germans really needed to fill.

Gneisenau’s heavy guns. |
But the basic premise did
meet Dutch requirements. The Dutch battlecruiser
that emerged from the IvS drawing boards looked
very much like the German ships, with some
key improvements. The Dutch ships would have
been faster (34 knots vs. 32 for Scharnhorst)
and had more range but slightly thinner armor
(but proof against 8-inch shellfire). Outwardly
they would look very much like Scharnhorst,
but with two funnels rather than the German
ship’s one.
They also would have had
substantially better anti-aircraft armament.
Scharnhorst carried a dozen 150mm (5.9-inch)
guns as secondary armament and fourteen 105mm
(4.1-inch) anti-aircraft guns because Germany
lacked a medium-caliber dual-purpose weapon.
The Dutch gave their Cruiser Killer a dozen
very effective 120mm (4.7-inch) dual-purpose
weapons in six dual mounts, plus 16 40mm automatic
weapons, all tied together by a sophisticated
fire-control system whose like would not be
seen until after World War II.
What the Dutch lacked was
a scheme for underwater protection; the Germans
refused to share the details of Scharnhorst’s
armor below the water line. With no experience
in building heavy warships, having skipped
the dreadnought age, the Dutch cast about
helplessly for assistance, finally scoring
a technical visit to Italy’s Ansaldo
yards. The Italians refused the plans of the
Pugliese system used in Vittorio Veneto
or a tour of the ship, but did allow the
Dutch to interview a number of engineers familiar
with the scheme. They were allowed to give
the Dutch any verbal information they requested,
but no technical drawings.
After much delay caused
by the hunt for underwater protection, the
Dutch engineers finally sketched a modified
Pugliese scheme for the battle cruisers. Contracts
had been let to four yards for the ships,
although only three units had been authorized,
hinting that the navy hoped to fund an extra
ship. But construction had not begun when
the Germans invaded the Netherlands and ended
the project.
Dutch naval intelligence
estimates were remarkably prescient: the did
indeed face Japan’s cruiser squadrons,
but supported by the four rebuilt battle cruisers
of the Kongo class. These would have
been formidable opponents for the Dutch Cruiser
Killers. The Dutch, like all other foreign
navies, also were not aware of the Japanese
24-inch oxygen-fueled “Long Lance”
torpedo. Though a weapon whose effectiveness
has been greatly overrated by later amateur
writers, it did give the Japanese cruisers
a means of striking at Dutch battle cruisers
well before the Dutch would have realized
the danger. But had the Cruiser Killers been
crewed and handled in the same manner as the
Dutch cruisers and destroyers that faced the
Japanese in 1942, these would have been deadly
opponents.
We’ve added yet another
free download, this time for the combined
game of Third
Reich and Great
Pacific War. If the Netherlands is
still neutral in Spring 1942 (that is, the
European portion has not been conquered by
any other power), add one 9-factor SURF to
the Dutch At Start Forces in the East Indies.
This should change Japanese planning.
You can download
the new counters here. |