Air War Over Verdun
By David Meyler
April 2007

The use of air power goes back more than 200 years, to hot-air balloons used for observation purposes around the time of the French Revolution. Powered, heavier-than-air aircraft were used in combat just a few years after the Wright brothers’ flight in 1904, in colonial conflicts in North Africa and in the Balkan wars.

However, it was not until the First World War that airplanes truly came into their own, developing into the “fourth” weapon, along with the more traditional arms of infantry, artillery and cavalry (itself to be radically transformed into a mechanized force).

War planners had doubts about early aircraft.

Before the War there were still questions about the military value of aircraft — for example, whether anything of value could be seen on the ground while traveling at such “incredible” speeds of 60 mph or more. Air-to-air combat was hardly considered, least of all between single-seat aircraft. How could the pilot manage the multiple complications of flying his craft, scan the skies and manage to target an opponent? Many early aircraft were too under-powered to carry a machine-gun, and most air crew, if they flew armed at all, carried a rifle or pistol.

Developments in both technology and organization occurred rapidly. By the end of 1915 the value of aerial reconnaissance and artillery spotting had been proven. Indeed, the air forces of all nations had largely taken over the task of information gathering, a role traditionally held by the cavalry (although information gathered by aircraft, photographic or otherwise, was still at times misused, misunderstood or simply ignored by conservative officers).

Questions, nevertheless, still remained about how air power could best be applied, both defensively and offensively, in terms of tactics, technology and organization.

The battle of Verdun — spotlighted in our game They Shall Not Pass — would see most of these questions answered.

German Superiority

Numerical superiority as a key advantage was certainly not in question, and the Germans had succeeded in building up one of the largest concentrations of aircraft yet seen: 168 aircraft, 12 tethered observation balloons and four airships (with perhaps 2,000 combat and support personnel in all, a veritable drop in the bucket in terms of the total number of troops committed).

While some specialization of equipment and operational role was taking place, the Germans were still organized into Flieger Abteilungen, Fl.Abt. or air units, comprising six (sometimes eight) aircraft. By 1916, most Fl.Abt. were organized by task: fighter, reconnaissance (with bombing and ground attack as secondary roles), and artillery spotting. Some units still used a mix of aircraft although the trend was towards equipping a unit with the same aircraft.

There were no larger organizational units. The Fifth Army in February 1916 directly controlled nine Fl.Abt. (reconnaissance Fl.Abt. 2, 60, 25, 34, and 44; and Artillerie Fl.Abt. 203, 207, 209 and 211). In addition there were Fl.Abt. 3b, 7b, 19, 70 and 71; and Artillerie Fl.Abt. 204 and 205, under Artillery Command Strantz.

The fighter forces had their own somewhat provisional organization called KEK (Kampfeinsitzerzkommandos). Two KEK were initially formed, called North and South, but the forces were re-organized into three, based at Bantheville, Jametz and Avillers. There were 21 Fokker and 19 Pfalz monoplane aircraft in total.

In terms of organization, the French were ahead of the Germans, having already developed single-purpose groupings called escadrilles, and can be credited with creating the first fighter squadron, N.65 (equipped with Nieuport 11s — French unit designations indicated the type of aircraft used N. for Nieuport, C. for Cauldron, M.S. for Morane Saulnier and M.F. for Maurice Farman).

Like their ground forces, the French air units in the Verdun area would be caught unprepared by the German onslaught. In the immediate area, the French had only two fighter escadrilles, N.23 and N.67, with four two-seater escadrilles, C.11, C.18, C.32 and M.F.63. Esc. C.32 had five pilots attached from the Royal Naval Air Service flying Nieuport 11s. In total, the French were outnumbered more than two-to-one in fighter strength, and three-to-one overall. As well there were the 28th and 31st Balloon companies (with two or three observation balloons).

The Fokker Scourge

The air battle over Verdun would see the first test of the concept of air superiority, the domination of the air space over a battlefield. The initial German response was largely defensive in nature, called the Luftsperre or “air barrage.” Constant patrols were to cordon off a section of air space. Flying in V formations of three planes, two-seater aircraft were largely used for this role, while single-seat fighters provided a secondary line to intercept any enemy aircraft that penetrated this first cordon.

A Fokker in Allied hands.

In the first day or two, this idea seemed to work, but once the French got over their initial surprise, German airmen found they could not stop French patrols from penetrating German air space pretty much at will. “Work” aircraft (the bombers and artillery spotters) were wasted on fruitless patrols, while more vital tasks went unfulfilled, and fighters could rarely intervene when needed.

Directed by Oswald Boelcke, one of the pre-eminent German flyers and theoreticians on air power, the German fighter service began to take a more offensive stance, from early March actively seeking out enemy aircraft in groupings of six to nine aircraft. He outlined his ideas on air combat in the so-called Boelcke Dicta: Always carry through an attack when you have started it; fire only at close range; fly to meet an enemy attack and do not attempt to flee; attack in formation and if a combat breaks up into individual fights, take care that several do not go for one opponent. Once the enemy fighter force was suppressed, friendly “working” aircraft could operate at will without fear of attack, while enemy air activity would be severely limited, if not stopped outright. The air barrage concept was abandoned for good. One of Boelcke's most apt pupils was the Baron Manfred von Richthofen, who would become Germany’s greatest fighter pilot with 80 confirmed aircraft shot down.

This fighting formed the second phase of the so-called “Fokker Scourge.” In the latter quarter of 1915, the Fokker Eindekker EI made its appearance, the first purpose-built fighter aircraft with a fixed forward-firing machine gun synchronized to fire between the propeller blades. This key development made aiming much easier and avoided difficult deflection shots (the EII and EIII featured some improvements, the latter with twin forward firing machine guns).

The Pfalz Eindekker, superficially similar in appearance, was operational at the same time and was often confused for the Fokker. The Eindekker’s armament proved a decisive advantage in combat with Allied aircraft which were restricted to wing or swivel-mounted weapons.

The impact on morale of Allied aircrew was potent. The Fokker had developed a lethal reputation, and there are reports of Allied crew abandoning a mission at the mere sight of a formation of Eindekkers. On April 8, a disoriented Fokker pilot accidentally landed behind enemy lines and his aircraft was captured intact. The Fokker was flown against a number of Allied craft and found to be inferior to the likes of the Nieuport 11 in speed, climb and maneuverability. That spring the much improved Nieuport 17 began to enter service, equipped with a synchronized machine gun. Fokker-phobia was dead.

Another French technical innovation was the Le Prieur air-to-air rocket. This weapon, a battery of four on each wing, was mounted on the wing struts of the Nieuports. While aiming was rudimentary, the rockets did prove lethal against large immobile targets such as the German observation balloons.

Escadrilles

As the technological edge began to tilt towards the Allies, the French also achieved numerical superiority. Major Tricornot de Rose of M.S.12 was given the job of reorganizing the air services at Verdun. He now had a total of 15 escadrilles formed into a Group de Chasse, a fighter wing. One of the formations in the group was the Escadrille Americaine, better known as the Lafayette Escadrille. Numbered N.124 in the French air force, the unit was established on April 16, composed mostly of American volunteers (although Frenchmen also served in the unit).

A French reconnaisance balloon at Verdun.

The French fighter units, flying in escadrille or semi-escadrille formation, began an aggressive campaign to find and destroy German fighters. The first true fighter vs. fighter air war was under way. If Boelcke’s new way gave the Germans air superiority during March, the French had achieved equilibrium during April, and had won air dominance by the end of that month.

The Germans in turn transformed the KEK into Staffeln, flights of six aircraft, the rough equivalent of an escadrille. The first Staffel was formed under Boelcke in early May. By the summer, individual Staffeln were grouped into a squadron-sized unit, the Jagdstaffel, with an official strength of 14 aircraft (often fewer in practice). New German aircraft began to enter service capable of taking on the Nieuports, in particular the Albatross DII with its shark-like fuselage and twin machine guns. By the fall, air superiority had swung towards the Germans once again.

Stars in the Sky

One final innovation seen at Verdun was the development of the cult of air ace (kanone in German). While never officially condoned in the British RAF, all combatants to some degree exploited and encouraged the hero worship of successful fighter pilots for propaganda and morale purposes. The intense aerial combat seen for the first time at Verdun helped in this development as a number of individuals quickly began to rack up impressive “scores” of downed enemy aircraft.

Jean Navarre became the prototype of the fighter pilot, noted for his flamboyance both in the air and on the ground. He became the first fighter pilot mentioned in a military communiqué after he downed two enemy airplanes on the same day, February 26, 1916. Known for his Nieuport 11 with its fuselage colored a bright scarlet (perhaps the first to adapt a personal color scheme for his plane), he had achieved a score of 12 enemy aircraft shot down before he himself was shot down and severely wounded that June. He survived but was not to fly in combat again.

Other French “stars” that emerged from the Verdun air battles were Alfred Heurtaux, who scored 21 “kills” before being invalided in 1917, and Georges Guynemer, one of the top French aces, who racked up a total score of 54 before he went missing in action in September 1917.

Boelcke shot down 40 enemy aircraft, many over Verdun, but was killed in an aerial collision in a dog fight in October 1916.

Mission-specific aircraft and formations, the squadron-wing organization, formation flying and the concept of air superiority were all innovations that were developed during the air battles over Verdun, and they still apply to air combat to this day. In spite of the technical and numerical limitations of the aircraft between 1914 and 1918, it had become clear that air superiority over a battlefield had become an important, if not decisive, element of victory.

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