Battle for Saipan, Part Seven
By David H. Lippman
April 2014

You can read Part Six here.

The Japanese were being worn down. Most of the 47th Brigade was being chewed up at Nafutan Point. Sixty percent of the 9th Tank Regiment had been wiped out. Most Japanese outfits were down to 50 percent of their manpower. After six days of fighting, the Japanese were down to eleven 75mm field pieces, 27 tanks, and three operational anti-aircraft guns.

But the Japanese were still full of samurai spirit. “The fierce attacks of the enemy only increase our hostility,” a Japanese tanker, Matsuya Tokuzo, wrote in his diary. “Every man is waiting for the assault with all weapons for close quarters fighting in readiness. We are waiting with Molotov Cocktails and hand grenades ready for the word to rush forward recklessly into the enemy ranks with our swords in our hands. The only thing that worries me is what will happen to Japan after we die.”

But the American advance was still moving slowly. At 6 a.m. on the 22nd, the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions, backed by 18 battalions of artillery plus naval and air support, launched a coordinated attack, making substantial gains on the lower slopes of Mount Tapotchau. The Marines faced counterattacks and heavy enemy fire, which was aggravated when a Japanese ammunition dump exploded. The official Marine historian wrote, “Looking to the north of the 6th and 8th Marines’ lines, a nightmare of sheer cliffs and precipitous hills could be observed, separated in crisscross fashion by deep gashes… dense foliage which cloaked the region often limited visibility to a few feet.” Leathernecks came under heavy Japanese crossfire from networks of well-defended caves and tunnels.

Back at Nafutan Point, the 105th Infantry struggled against the Japanese, gaining little ground. Holland Smith warned Ralph Smith that if the 105th did not advance, he would fire its colonel. Ralph Smith responded that the Japanese were holding difficult terrain.

Meanwhile, the battle raged on. Holland Smith ordered 27th Division into the main attack, leaving Nafutan to a single rifle battalion and a platoon of six light tanks, with very little artillery and amidst mountainous terrain. The GIs struggled through the ground, their tanks unable to maneuver, battling emplaced machineguns and determined defenders.

Studying his maps, 4th Marine Division’s CO, Gen. Harry Schmidt, regarded Holland Smith’s plan as overly optimistic, and penciled in a line for reorganization 2,000 yards short of Holland Smith’s objective line. Even so, the Marines struggled to reach that chinagraphed line on Schmidt’s map, climbing up hills pockmarked by caves and tunnels. As the Marines advanced, Japanese troops would charge out of caves in counterattacks.

As the sun set, both sides were facing immense difficulties. Holland Smith needed a continuous front line, while Saito was sending every available man into the same rugged country

On the 23rd, the Army’s 106th and 165th Regiments were ordered to attack a ridge north of their lines and a valley just west of it. The Japanese defenders included the 118th Infantry Regiment, which had lost most of its equipment and weapons, along with 850 men, to American submarines. Its 2,600 remaining men were somewhat disorganized. The other outfit was the 136th Infantry Regiment, which had held the beaches, and was now ground down to less than 1,000 men. Despite these weaknesses, the Japanese had major advantages – the 1,000-yard-long bare valley that was dominated by mountains, and the ridge itself, a series of hills pockmarked with cliffs, caves, and heavy underbrush, all perfect for a determined defense. The Americans would come to name the valley “Death Valley” and the hills “Purple Heart Ridge.”

The Japanese also had a great deal of well-concealed light and heavy mortars, and 75mm mountain guns.

Seven American regiments, two Army and five Marine, would make the assault. The first American objective was “Hill Love,” and the 1st/165th led the way with a platoon of tanks from the 762nd Provisional Tank Battalion. The Japanese set the tank commanded by Lt. Louis W. Fleck on fire with a Molotov Cocktail. As the tank crew leaped out from the blazing machine, the Japanese cut them down. Advancing Americans were greeted by heavy small-arms and machine-gun fire. The 3rd/165th tried to attack a little cove in the mountain wall studded with Japanese machine-guns and their crews. Coming under heavy fire, the GIs named the position “Hell’s Pocket.” Self-propelled artillery rumbled up to shell the Japanese, but their crews were exposed to sniper fire, and had to pull back.

What the Army would call the “Battle of the Caves” raged on ferociously. The 762nd Tank Battalion sent 72 Shermans into action; only 18 “runners” were left at the day’s end. The 3rd/106th came under Japanese mortar fire that took 31 men in less than a minute.

Watching this futile attack, Holland Smith fumed over the Army’s poor showing. Studying the island from 1,554-foot-high Tapotchau summit with a powerful Japanese telescope he found there, Holland Smith assessed Saipan’s mountains and valleys. His Marines were taking a pounding, but taking ground: the 2nd Marine Division had lost 2,514 men, while the 4th had lost 3,628. The 27th Division’s two fresh regiments would now have to be the main assault force.

One of Holland Smith’s staff officers explained the situation to Robert Sherrod: “We cannot attack Mt. Tapotchau until the 27th Division moves up and we’ve got to have the high ground so we can look down the Japs’ throats instead of letting them look down ours. If we don’t keep pressing them, they’ll reorganize and dig in deeper, and casualties will shoot up higher. We can’t sit back and expect artillery and naval gunfire to blast them out of the caves.”

Now the differences between the Marine and Army approach to war began to plague the American drive. Holland Smith and his Marines stressed high-cost frontal assaults and relied on speed, aggression, and violence to achieve their goals. Ralph Smith and his GIs favored the Army’s standard holding attack, which relied on one force holding the enemy under pressure while a second force outflanked the defenders, relying on movement and firepower. While such tactics had their advantages, the Marines believed that only close assaults would break the defenders.

27th Division troops on the advance, Saipan, 1944.

Furthermore, Holland Smith did not think much of the 27th. He said it was a “New York silk stocking outfit with an impeccable reputation for annual balls, banquets and shipshape summer camps which contains the entangled roots of home town loyalties, ambition and intrigue and should be broken up and replaced with anyone on earth but former members of the New York National Guard.” Holland Smith believed the 27th was “flat and listless,” and he blamed Ralph Smith.

The Army general objected to this view of his division – he pointed out that it included the famous “Fighting 69th” Regiment of Civil War and World War I fame, and many of its men were not New York City society slickers, but from the state’s less glamorous farming and mountain country.

Holland Smith called in Army Maj. Gen. Sanderford Jarman, who was to take command of the island once it was secured, and ordered him to visit Ralph Smith and convey the corps commander’s displeasure. Holland Smith warned Ralph Smith that if the 27th was not an Army division “and there would be a great cry sent up more or less of a political nature,” he would immediately relieve Ralph Smith.

Ralph Smith admitted that his division “was not carrying its full share” and he was “in no way satisfied with what his regimental commanders had done during the day.” He promised to “personally see to it that the division went forward.” Supposedly, Ralph Smith added that “if the division does not go forward tomorrow, I should be relieved.”

Holland Smith gave his namesake subordinate one more day to make progress, but the Japanese were as stolid and ferocious as ever. Fifth Amphibious Corps attacked on Saturday, June 24, with the 8th Marines digging Japanese positions out with satchel charges, bazookas, and flamethrowers. Cpl. Bernard Riggs, part of the Combat Intelligence section of the 2nd/8th Marines, found himself in no-man’s land. He wrote later, “I had learned that a good foxhole could be a lifesaver, so I took my little Government Issue shovel, but I couldn’t make much headway as I found that in this higher mountain area there was rock hidden under the six inches of soil covering it. I was able to borrow a pick and that helped, but I kept chopping and chipping until my hands were bleeding and then I kept going until it was deep enough to afford me a little extra room to squirm.”

Death Valley, Saipan.

At least the Marines had a sense of progress, despite suffering 812 casualties in the 4th Division over the 23rd and 24th, and 333 in the 2nd for the same two days.

Meanwhile, Saito had angled his defenders to give a rough reception to the 27th Infantry in Death Valley, which in turn fronted Saito’s headquarters. The Japanese general was determined to hold on, and he had 4,000 men, backed by most of the 9th Tank Regiment’s T-97s in position to do so. All of his caves deployed machine-guns, mortars, or 75mm guns.

A shorter version of this appeared in the February 2014 issue of WW2 History magazine, published by Sovereign Media, and is used with permission.

David H. Lippman, an award-winning journalist and graduate of the New School for Social Research, has written many magazine articles about World War II. He currently works as a public information officer for the city of Newark, N.J. We're always pleased to add his work to our Daily Content.